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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant seeks to overturn the lower Court's 
order committing him to the Salt Lake County Jail, 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
On the 12th day of January$ 1976 an Order to 
Show Cause as to why probation should not be terminated 
and appellant committed to the Salt Lake County Jail issued. 
After a hearing on January 27, 1976, the Honorable Robert 
C. Gibson committed appellant to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
A Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus issued and was denied. 
From the denial this appeal is taken. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
granted. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant pleaded guilty to the crime of petty 
larceny in Salt Lake City Court on the 24th day of October, 
1974. He was sentenced to six months * imprisonment. Impo-
sition of the sentence was stayed and appellant was placed 
on probation for one year* On January 12, 1976 an Order to 
Show Cause as to why probation should not be terminated and 
a committment issue; a hearing was held on January 27, 1976, 
before the Honorable Robert C, Gibson, and it was determined 
that petitioner had violated his probation and he was ordered 
committed to the Salt Lake County Jail for six months, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PLACING THE APPEL-
LANT ON PROBATION FOR A PERIOD LONGER THAN 
APPELLANT COULD HAVE BEEN INCARCERATED AND, 
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT LOST JURISDICTION 
OVER THE APPELLANT WHEN HE HAD SERVED SIX 
MONTHS OF HIS PROBATION^-THE STATUTORY LIMIT 
FOR INCARCERATION FOR THE CRIME OF WHICH 
APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED. 
This issue is a novel one in this jurisdiction. 
In almost all jurisdictions clear statutes exist which 
precisely define the limits placed on the judiciary by the 
legislature with respect to permissible lengths of proba-
tion. In those jurisdictions where such statutes do not 
exist, the determination of this issue has been a diffi-
cult one. Nevertheless, the weight of the case law indi-
cates that there is only one possible answer to the question— 
when no maximum limit is placed by the legislature on the 
duration of probation, the limit is the miximum length of 
time for which a defendant could have been incarcerated. 
The Utah statute with respect to probation reads 
as follows: 
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"Upon a plea of guilty or conviction 
of any crime or offense , if it appears 
compatible with the public interest, 
the court having jurisdiction may sus-
pend the imposition or the execution 
of sentence and may place the defendant 
on probation for such period of time 
as the court may determine, 
'The court may subsequently increase 
or decrease the probation period, and 
may revoke or modify any condition of 
probation, (77^35-17 Utah Code Anno*, 
1953).» 
As the statute is presently written no limit to 
the duration of probation appears on its face* Apparently 
the statute grants power to the judiciary to place appellant 
on probation for as long as the Court sees fit, even for the 
entire life of defendant, and to subsequently revoke pro-
bation and then impose a prison sentence. It is appellant's 
contention that such an interpretation of the statute is 
contrary to general principles of law and deprives defendant 
of important fundamental freedoms in an unconscionable manner. 
In Oklahoma the question was first raised in Ex Parte 
Eaton, 29 Okla, Ct, App. 275, 233 P« 781 (1925), In that case 
the statute provided that a qualified defendant might be placed 
on probation and remain on probation provided that he was not 
later guilty of a violation of any law or condition of pro-
bation. Defendant had been sentenced to two years in prison, 
but imposition was stayed and defendant was placed on probation. 
- 3 -
Three months after defendant had completed serving two years 
of probation, the trial court revoked the order of probation 
and ordered defendant incarcerated. The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court disallowed the order: 
flIt was certainly not the intention 
of the lawmakers to hold sentence over 
the head of the person paroled so long 
as he should live, but only during the 
pendency of the judgment. To hold 
otherwise would be contrary to the 
spirit and policy of the law" C3T3 P. 
at 782; emphasis added) 
Ex Parte Eaton, supra, has been followed in many 
other cases in that jurisdiction: Ex Parte King, 40 Okla. 
Ct* App, 21, 266 P, 511 (1928)j Ex Parte Anderson, 47 Okla. 
Ct. App. 363, 288 P. 503 (1920)? In re Workman, 74 Okla. 
Ct. App. 225 (1942); Ex Parte Miller, 88 Okla, Ct, App. 441 
(1949); Ex Parte Bell, 57 Okla. Ct. App. 257, 47 P.2d 886 
(1935). 
Though the Oklahoma statute dealt with minors, 
that point was immaterial to the Court. It interpreted its 
statute by saying: "If there is any ambiguity, it should 
be resolved in favor of the person sentenced." (233 P. 
at 782). It was the Courtfs considered opinion that proba-
tionary periods should not exceed statutory periods of 
incarceration unless the legislature affirmatively granted 
such a power to the judiciary in precise, defined terms, 
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In Kansas a statute gave the judiciary the alternat-
ive of choosing probation under certain conditions. The 
statute then went on to say $ 
"Such judge may at any time, without 
notice to such persons, terminate such 
parole by simply directing execution 
to issue on the judgment," (Kansas Laws 
of 1909, C. 116, Sec. 2; emphasis added.) 
I n
 In re Carroll, 91 Kan. 395, 137 P. 975 (1914), 
the Court recognized the apparent grant of absolute discre-
tion, yet the Court found it difficult to admit of such 
control by the judiciary. The case involved a misdemeanor 
punishable under statutory authority by no more than six 
months imprisonment. The Court argued strenuously that 
there had to be a limit to the Courtls discretion to place 
a defendant on probation for extended periods of time? 
"Although the statute relating to 
paroles (probation) granted by police 
judges does not expressly declare a 
limit, one is doubtless contemplated, 
and, since provision is made for im-
prisonment for a fixed time, that should 
be regarded as the limit of time for 
the termination o£ a parole (probation) 
and the absolute discharge of the paroled 
person." (137 P. at 977; emphasis and 
parentheses added.) 
In re Carroll was followed by Simons v. Walston, 
123 Kan. 574, 255 P. 975 (1926). It was not until the 
legislature amended the statute some 33 years later that 
the Kansas court altered its position because the 
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amended portion provided for probation of up to two years 
in the case of misdemeanors. Application of Young, 201 Kan. 
140, 439 P.2d 142 (1968), 
In Idaho, beginning with State v, Eikelberger, 
71 Id. 282, 230 P,2d 696 (1951)., the Idaho Supreme Court 
interpreted its 1947 probation statute which granted to 
the trial court the right to place on probation "for such 
time as it may prescribe." In spite of such brocid and gen-
eral language, the Supreme Court of Idaho has also refused 
to grant such enormous power to the courts without some 
legislative pronouncement, 
"The period of probation and restraint 
of the liberty of the defendant extended 
for two years, while the crime which the 
defendant was found guilty of committing 
was punishable by imprisonment for a period 
of time not exceeding six months,,. The Court 
had the power to impose a judgment and order 
of probation for a period of six months, 
(230 P.2d at 701) 
This case has been followed in Ex Parte Medley, 
73 Id. 474, 253 P.2d 794 (1953) and in State v. Sandoval, 
92 Id. 853, 452 P.2d 350, (1969), 
The anomalies that would result from any other 
holding were discussed by the Florida Supreme Court as 
recently as six months ago. Watts v. State, Fla, 
__ , 328 So. 2d 223 (1976) : 
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"There is validity to not allowing 
probation to extend beyond the period 
of maximum sentences. First, a penal 
statute must be strictly construed 
in favor of those against whom it 
would operate; and second, to infer 
that a court could extend probation 
beyond such a maximum permitted pun-
ishment would lead to unacceptable 
results% For although the period of 
probation imposed here was only one 
year beyond the maximum sentence, 
the absence of any limit raises the 
possibility that a judge could direct 
many years of probation even for a 
misdemeanor, a concept which has 
the potential to inject further dis-
parities into the corrective proce¥s," 
(328 So.2d at 223, emphasis added) 
The Florida Court is correct. However small the 
disparities might appear for those of us never incarcerated, 
they would not be so for those forced to endure them. Forum 
shopping, though often the cry of "wolf," is a real possi-
bility both for the defense seeking leniency as well as for 
the prosecution who might have a defendant on a minor charge 
but wish to keep him "out of circulation," 
The Florida case is all the more significant because 
of the history of its probation statute. It was originally 
drafted in 1943 and provided for probation to exceed the 
incarceration limit by two years, In 1974 the statute was 
altered so as to contain no limits at all. The statute could 
have been construed so as to allow for a lenient and broad 
interpretation, but the Court rejected that approach, Watts v. 
State, supra. 
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In another recent case in Wyoming, Hicklin v. State, 
Wyo. , 535 P.2d 743 (1976) , the Court was quite 
concerned about the rights of a defendant and after a prolonged 
discussion of the problems, refused to grant such total dis-
cretion to the judiciary. 
"A person on probation is not serving a 
sentence but is in a status something 
less than imprisonment that follows upon 
suspension of sentence. It connotes an 
absence of the rigors of confinement in 
a penitentiary, but at the same time is 
a substitute for complete imprisonment. 
It is imposed only upon convicted criminals, 
and results in a considerable restriction 
upon their liberty as well as intrusions 
upon their private lives. Fundamentally, 
it is a device for achieving the same 
social goals furthered by the more con-
ventional penalty of society*s desire 
for retribution and deterrence and its 
hope for rehabilitation. It is a loss 
of a part of cherished liberty in that 
freedom of movement and activity £s 
restricted; the criminal is constantly 
under surveillance, must report Els acti-
vities on a regular basis, and iF"deprived 
of intoxicants^ In this case, twelve 
restraints are placed upon indepen-
dence... A probationer is a convict 
without bars with a sword of threat 
hanging over his head, that for a devia-
tion the doors may be slammed shut on 
him. 
*We therefore conclude that probation is 
constructive confinement and the restraints 
of probation cannot exceed a period in 
excess of the maximum term of imprisonment 
authorized by the statute violated." 
(535 P.2d at 753; emphasis added) 
- 8 -
The Wyoming Supreme Court was not persuaded by 
arguments that probation is some sort of humanitarian grace 
period, some wonderful chance to be free and be pardoned, 
some light tap on the hand. It is not! It is in fact a 
kind of incarceration. 
We are in fact discussing the restriction of a 
manfs freedom, a penalty imposed on his conduct. Probation 
is not a gift. It is a better situation than the bars of 
a prison cell, but probation is also the restriction of fun-
damental freedoms. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the 
penal qualities of the probation sentence. Korematsu v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 432, 63 S. Ct. 1124, 87 L. Ed. 1497 
(1943). 
11
.«,. incidents of probation emphasize 
that a probation order is fan author-
ized mode of mild and ambulatory pun-
ishment, the probation being intended 
as a reforming discipline. *,f (319 U.S. 
at 435) 
See also Cooper v. United States, (5th Cirt), 
91 F.2d 195 (1937). In that case the Court goes on to say: 
"We do not agree with appellant's con~ 
tention that probation, like pardon, 
may be refused by the convicted person. 
The act vests a discretion in the Court, 
not a choice in the convict." (91 F.2d 
at 199, emphasis added) 
Probation cannot be looked at as anything less than 
a sentence of limited incarceration. Authority for sentencing 
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must come from the legislature. Hicklin v. State, supra• 
Affronti v. United States, 350 U,S, 79, 76 S. Ct. 171, 100 
L. Ed. 62 (1955); Andrus v. Turner, (10th Cir.), 421 F,2d 
290 (1970); In re Gutierrez, 82 Ariz, 21, 307 P.2d 914, 
(1957) cert. den. 355 U.S. 17, 78 S. Ct. 79, 2 L. Ed. 2d 23; 
State v. Perez, 15 Ariz. App. 300, 488 P.2d 505 (1971); 
Pete v. State, Ala. , 379 P.2d 625 (1963); State 
v. Smith, 83 Okla. Ct. 188, 174 P.2d 932 (1946), 
Furthermore, a large body of law stands for the pro-
position that probation can only exist if the legislature 
acts. Affronti v. United States, supra; People ex rel 
Lindauer v. O'Donnell, 37 Cal. App. 192, 174 P. 102 (19 ); 
Williams v. State, 162 Ga. 327, 133 S.E. 843 (1926); Ex Parte 
Eaton, supra; In re Hall, 100 Vt. 197, 136 A, 24 (1927); 
Pickman v. State, Fla. , 155 So. 2d 646 (1963) ; 
State v. Duncan, Ore. , 514 P.2d 1367 (1973). 
On the basis of all the above case law, it is clear 
that in the absence of a statute clearly defining the limits 
to which a court may go in imposing probation, a trial court 
may not impose a probation sentence for a period longer than 
the statutory period for incarceration. To the same affect 
are several proposed criminal codes. 
The American Bar Association and several other 
groups have proposed model codes as suggestions for State 
Legislators in the area of probation. Groups such as the 
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ABA have suggested statutes which allow courts to order pro-
bation for periods longer than the stipulated period for 
incarceration, ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice -
Standards Relating to Probation, On the other hand, the 
National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice, Standards 
and Goals (Corrections) §16,11 advises that probation not 
exceed the prescribed limits for incarceration. No uniform 
opinion on the subject is therefore apparent. States have 
chosen both types of statutes. With such disparity over an 
issue involving personal freedoms surely the courts ought to 
function with judicial restraint and allow the legislature 
to perform its proper function and make a determination of 
the pressures and philosophical questions involved in a forum 
best suited to that process. 
Secondly, the fact that many states have adopted 
one or the other of the proposed statutes or revised versions 
of these model codes cannot impute to the Utah Legislature 
a statute it has not adopted no matter what the national trend. 
More importantly, whatever the trend of other State Legislatures, 
certainly their considered and debated opinions should not 
influence courts to take upon themselves a legislative func-
tion by choosing one of the two alternative statutes. 
Thirdly, although the ABA certainly advocates a 
broader statute, it does not advocate court adoption of its 
model statute. 
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H(a) The legislature should authorize 
the sentencing court in every case 
to impose a sentence of probation,,!t 
(Part 1, General Principles, 1,1 Nature 
of sentence of probation, emphasis added) 
At the outset, the ABA recognizes the Legislature's 
authority and prerogative in this area. The ABA is quick 
to acknowledge that courts must receive permission to im-
pose this sentence. 
To further emphasize this principle at (d) of the 
same provisions, the ABA states: 
"Neither supervision nor the power to 
revoke should be permitted to extend 
beyond a legislatively fixed time„M 
(emphasis added) 
The ABA is not asking courts to do anything. It is 
recommending quite strongly that Legislatures allow courts to 
function in this area and that Legislatures maintain a firm 
control over the subject, presumably to avoid abuse and ensure 
a proper functioning of the system with useful, practical, 
and equitable standards. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant petitions this Court to vacate the order 
of incarceration entered by the lower Court on the 27th day 
of January, 1976, and grant appellant's Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Rokert M, McRae 
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief to the 
Office of the Attorney General, Utah State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84114 this 3d day of September, 1976, postage 
prepaid. 
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